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United States penitentiaries housed 2,173,800 inmates in 2015.
1
 
According to the 2010 United States Census, correctional facilities, as 
a whole, are more populous than fourteen states.
2
 The prison 
population suffers from higher rates of mental illness, chronic medical 
conditions, and infectious diseases compared to the general United 
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 In fact, more than eight in ten inmates, in both state 
and federal prison, receive medical care while incarcerated.
4
 
A constitutional violation may arise out of the Eighth Amendment 
if a prisoner’s medical treatment, or lack thereof, is found to constitute 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”
5
 Claims of deficient medical care do 
not always rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
6
 
Negligence in diagnosis or medical treatment, typically addressed in 
medical malpractice or medical negligence actions, does not become a 
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.
7
  
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court of the United States 
established the “deliberate indifference” standard to analyze whether 
the acts or omissions in a prisoner’s medical treatment violate the 
Eighth Amendment.
8
 A claim of deliberate indifference contains an 
objective as well as a subjective component.
9
 To establish the 
objective component, a court must find that the plaintiff-prisoner 
suffered from an objectively serious medical condition.
10
 The 
subjective component requires the court to analyze whether the 
defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to the prisoner’s 
health.
11
 To establish this second component, the defendant must, first, 
have been aware of the facts from which he could infer the existence 




                                                 
3
 Karishma A. Chari, et. al, National Survey of Prison Health Care: Selected 
Findings, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. 96 (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr096.pdf. 
4
 Laura M. Maruschak, Medical Problems of Prisoners, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/mpp/mpp.cfm (last visited October 4, 
2017). 
5
 See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). 
6






 Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). 
10




 Id. at 837. 
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Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit was tasked with applying the deliberated indifference standard. 
In Lewis v McLean, et al., James Lewis, a prisoner, alleged that 
Lieutenant Joseph Cichanowicz and Nurse Angela McLean, amongst 
other defendants, were deliberately indifferent by delaying his access 
to medical care.
13
 On the other hand, Cichanowicz and McLean argued 
that they were unable to provide care to Lewis because McLean was 
not following their commands.
14
 The Seventh Circuit vacated the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the deliberate 
indifference claim against Cichanowicz and McLean.
15
 The majority 
reasoned that a reasonable jury could find that Cichanowicz and 
McLean exhibited deliberate indifference in delaying Lewis's 
treatment, causing Lewis unnecessary suffering.
16
 The concurrence 
illustrated that the deliberate indifference standard used by courts is 
merely tangential to the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
17
  
This article will analyze the strength of the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in light of precedent and public policy. Part I contains the 
legal standards applicable to claims of deliberate indifference brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the legal distinctions between such 
claims and state law medical malpractice claims. Part II discusses the 
factual and procedural background of Lewis v. McLean, et al. Part III 
argues that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided Lewis v. McLean, 
et al. on precedential and public policy grounds. It further argues that 
the courts should return to following the text of the Constitution and 
apply the cruel and unusual punishment standard. 
 
BACKGROUND AND STANDARDS  
 
The Supreme Court established the government has a duty to 
provide medical care for those it is punishing by way of 
                                                 
13
 Lewis, 864 F.3d at 560. 
14
 Id. at 564. 
15
 Id. at 566. 
16
 Id. at 563–64. 
17
 Id. at 566 (Manion, J., concurring). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for 
prisoners subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 





A.  History of Eighth Amendment’s Proscription of Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment  
 
The drafters of the United States Constitution took the language 
of the Eighth Amendment from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
20
 
Like the English, the primary concern of the drafters of the Eighth 
Amendment was to prevent torture and other barbarous methods of 
punishment.
21
 Use of the Eighth Amendment was limited through the 
nineteenth century.
22
 During this time, the courts declined arguments 
to extend the protections of the Eighth Amendment to include 
punishments disproportionate to the crime.
23
  
In 1910, the Supreme Court modified its approach in analyzing 
the cruel and unusual protection clause of the Eighth Amendment.
24
 In 
Weems v. United States, the Court extended Eighth Amendment 
protections to excessive punishment, no longer limiting its protections 
strictly to torture and barbarous acts.
25
 The Court stated: “a principle 
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief 
                                                 
18
 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
19
 U.S. Const. amend. VIII; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
20
 Stuart Klein, Prisoners’ Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A 
Modern Expansion of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1, 2 (1978). The English Bill of Rights of 1689 
provided that “excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Id. 
21
 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; Klein, supra note 20, at 3. 
22
 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; Klein, supra note 20, at 3. 
23
 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102; Klein, supra note 20, at 3. 
24
 Holly Boyer, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment's 
‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment’ Clause As Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. 
U.L. REV. 317, 318 (2003). 
25
 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
4
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which gave it birth.”
26
 Hence, the Court adopted the view that the 
Eighth Amendment was to continually evolve with changing societal 
views of prison conditions and humane justice.
27
 Decades later, the 
Supreme Court returned to the cruel and unusual punishment clause 
analysis.
28
 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court reinforced that the Eighth 




Post Trop, courts began analyzing the constitutionality of 
treatment in prisons against this backdrop of “evolving standards of 
decency.”
30
 The relative vagueness of this guideline created pressure 
to analyze claims of cruel and unusual punishment under new 
standards.
31
 This led courts to apply many different judicial tests to 
inadequate medical care claims, such as “abuse of discretion,” 




The Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Gamble, resolved the lower court 
confusion by adopting the standard of “deliberate indifference.”
33
 In 
Estelle, inmate J.W. Gamble was injured when a bale of cotton fell on 
him while performing prison work.
34
 He continued to work for four 
hours until he became stiff.
35
 Gamble was granted a pass to the unit 
hospital and was seen by a physician.
36
 The prison physician 
prescribed a pain reliever, a muscle relaxant, in-cell meals, and 
                                                 
26
 Id. at 373; Klein, supra note 20, at 4. 
27
 Boyer, supra note 24; Klein, supra note 20, at 5. 
28
 Boyer, supra note 24. 
29
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
30
 Klein, supra note 20, at 6. 
31
 Id. at 7. 
32
 See Flint v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1970); Campbell v. Beto, 
460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Klein, supra note 20, at 7. 
33
 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). 
34
 See id. at 99. 
35
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allowed Gamble to remain in his cell except for showers.
37
 Despite the 
measures taken by the physician, Gamble continued to complain of 
pain.
38
 Gamble was seen by prison medical professionals seventeen 
times within a three-month period.
39
  
The District Court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
40
 The Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the 
complaint.
41
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
42
 
 In its decision, the Estelle Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s 
application of the broader standard of “reasonable care.”
43
 Rather, the 
Court held that “in order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must 
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs.
44
 A medical need is “serious,” 
satisfying the Estelle test, if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a 
physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay 
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
45
  
It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of 
decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
46
 The Court 
reiterated that prison personnel are required to provide medical care 
for a prisoner “who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, 
care for himself.”
47
 The Court reversed, finding that while deliberate 
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical condition constitutes cruel 




 Id. at 99-101. 
39
 Id. at 107. 
40






 Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969); Klein, supra note 20 
at 15. 
44
 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
45
 Pace v. Fauver, 479 F.Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J.1979), aff’d, 649 F.2d 860 (3d 
Cir.1981). 
46
 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
47
 Id. at 104. 
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and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 
Gamble’s complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action.
48
 
Despite the Court’s attempt to clarify in Estelle,
49
 lower courts 
inconsistently interpreted and applied the deliberate indifference test.
50
 
This resulted in different analyses of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983.
51
 The Court revisited the deliberate indifference standard in 
Farmer v. Brennan and further clarified its meaning.
52
 
In Farmer, Dee Farmer a transsexual inmate filed a Bivens
53
 
action alleging that the prison officials acted with deliberate 
indifference to the substantial risk of physical abuse and sexual abuse 
he
54
 suffered while in the penitentiary.
55
 Although Farmer did not 
involve treatment by a medical professional, the Court applied the 
same analysis.
56
 Evaluating whether Farmer’s claim was a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court maintained that a violation of the 
cruel and unusual punishment provision occurs when a two-prong 
test
57
 has been satisfied.
58
 Following Wilson v. Seither, a constitutional 
                                                 
48
 Id. at 98. 
49
 See id. at 97. 
50
 Heather M. Kinney, The "Deliberate Indifference" Test Defined: Mere Lip 
Service to the Protection of Prisoners' Civil Rights, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 




 See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).  
53
 Civil rights cases against the federal government and its agents are brought 
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, knowns as “Bivens actions.” See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
54
 Farmer is a pre-operative transsexual, biologically born a male. Farmer took 
several medical steps to transition to a female but ultimately did not complete sex 
reassignment. To avoid confusion, pronouns referencing Farmer correspond with 
those used by the Court. 
55
 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829. 
56
  Meaghan A. Sweeney, Reasonable Response: The Achilles’ Heel of the 
Seventh Circuit’s “Deliberate Indifference” Analysis, REV. 12 SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
REV. 62 (2016), at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic Programs/7CR 
/v12-1/sweeney.pdf. 
57
 The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991), held that 
claims of inadequate medical treatment only implicate the Eighth Amendment if the 
7
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violation occurs when the alleged deprivation is objectively and 
sufficiently serious,
59
 and the prison official acted with deliberate 
indifference to inmate health or safety.
60
 Expanding on the second 
requirement, the Court stated that “a prison official must have a 
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ to violate the Eighth Amendment's 
cruel and unusual punishments clause.”
61
  
The Farmer Court clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference 
by comparing the criminal and civil definitions of recklessness.
62
 In 
the criminal context, criminal law requires that one is aware of harm 
and disregards that risk of harm.
63
 However, civil law only requires 
that one knew or should have known of an unjustifiably high risk of 
harm.
64
 The Court adopted the criminal law standard “that a prison 
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the 
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety.”
65
 The Court expanded that the official “must both be aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
66
 The Court 
noted, however, that an official who actually knew of a substantial risk 
to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if the 
official responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not 
ultimately averted.
67
 Applying this standard, the Farmer Court held 
                                                                                                                   
alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and the deprivation was an “unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain.” 
58
 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
59




 Id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 
62
 Id. at 837. 
63
 Id. at 837-38. 
64






 Id. at 844. 
8
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that prison officials did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
68
 The 
Court instructed that a prison official’s duty under the Eighth 
Amendment deliberate indifference standard is to ensure “reasonable 
safety” to inmates,
69
 and that the occurrence of an injury by a prisoner 





B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Medical Malpractice 
 
There are two avenues under which medical professionals treating 
prisoners are vulnerable to lawsuits: Eighth Amendment claims 
brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983
71
 and state law medical malpractice 
actions. The Estelle Court explicitly stated that a prisoner’s claim of 
inadequate medical care does not always constitute an Eighth 
Amendment claim.
72
 Moreover, medical malpractice claims alleging 
negligent treatment or diagnosis of a medical condition do not 
transform into an Eighth Amendment claim merely because the patient 
is a prisoner.
73
Although the facts surrounding the claims may be 
                                                 
68
 Id. at 825. 
69
 Id. at 844. 
70
 Id. at 834. 
71
 42 U.S.C. §1983. This section provides: “Every person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia.” Id. 
72
 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). 
73
 Id. at 106. 
9
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identical, state medical malpractice claims and Eight Amendment 
claims are more different than similar.
74
  
A primary difference between these two claims is the standard 
which the plaintiff must prove. In a medical malpractice claim, the 
plaintiff must prove that the medical care provider deviated from the 
standard of care and that the deviation proximately caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.
75
 In contrast, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 a plaintiff must 
prove a “deliberate indifference.”
76
 
A second distinction between the two claims lies in the use of 
expert witnesses and expert testimony. In state medical malpractice 
actions, experts are a barrier to entry for many state actions
77
 and 
virtually a necessity in the pleading stages. While retaining an expert 
is not necessarily difficult, it is expensive.
78
 This expense generally 
prevents most inmates from retaining an expert.
79
 If the inmate cannot 
retain an expert, then the inmate cannot file a state law medical 
malpractice claim.
80
 Conversely, Eighth Amendment claims do not 
require the support of an expert; a plaintiff need only file a suit.
 81
 
                                                 
74
 Chapman Law Group, The Difference Between a Medical Malpractice Claim 
and a Deliberate Indifference (42 § USC 1983 Civil Rights) Claim, CHAPMAN LAW 
GROUP BLOG (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://chapmanlawgroup.com/medicalmalpractice_1983civilrights/.  
75
 Steven E. Pegalis, Expert Testimony, AM. LAW MED. MALP. §8:1 (June 
2017). 
76
 See supra notes 139-150 and accompanying text for the history and nuances 
of the deliberate indifference standard. 
77
 See e.g., Chapman, supra note 74 (“In most states before the plaintiff can file 
a medical malpractice claim he/she must obtain a written opinion from a physician or 
other health care professional licensed in the same specialty.”). 
78
 See e.g., Chapman, supra note 74. 
79
 See e.g., id. 
80
 See e.g., id. 
81
 Joel H. Thompson, Today's Deliberate Indifference: Providing Attention 
Without Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45 HARV. 
C.R. C.L. L. REV. 635, 651-52 (2010).  
10
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A final distinction is that most states impose a cap on damages 
and prohibit punitive damages on medical malpractice claims,
82
 
whereas Eighth Amendment claims have no such cap or limitation.
83
 A 
successful Eighth Amendment suit entitles the plaintiff to recover 




LEWIS V. MCLEAN, ET AL.  
 
A. The Facts 
 
James Lewis was incarcerated at Wisconsin State Secure Program 
Facility when, on February 8, 2014, he woke up at approximately 5:15 
a.m. and attempted to get out of bed.
85
 Upon his attempt, he 
experienced sharp pain from the base of his neck to his tailbone.
86
 Due 
to the pain, Lewis could neither lie back down nor stand up.
87
 He 
remained unable to move until 5:39 a.m. when he leaned forward and 
pressed the emergency call button on the wall of his cell.
88
 As Lewis 
was housed in segregation, the guard who answered the call looked at 
the live video footage from the security camera in Lewis’s cell and 
                                                 
82
 Notably, Wisconsin, the state where James Lewis presides as a prisoner, had 
a $750,000 limitation on noneconomic medical malpractice damages when Lewis 
filed his case. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 893.55 (2008). However, on July 5, 2017, the Court 
of Appeals of Wisconsin held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was 
unconstitutional. Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2017 
WI App 52, ¶ 1. The court reasoned that the statutory cap was unconstitutional on its 
face because it violated the principles the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated in 
Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 
Wis.2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440, “by imposing an unfair and illogical burden only on 
catastrophically injured patients, thus denying them the equal protection of the 
laws.” Id. 
83
 Chapman, supra note 74. 
84
 See 42 U.S.C. §1988. 
85
 Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 2017). 
86




 Id. at 559.  
11
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saw him sitting on the bed.
89
 The guard then inquired what the 
emergency was; Lewis replied that he was suffering from extreme pain 
in his back and was unable to move.
90
 The guard relayed this 
information to Lieutenant Joseph Cichanowicz, a security supervisor.
91
  
At some time thereafter, Cichanowicz went to Lewis’s cell where 
Lewis explained that he was experiencing terrible pain and could not 
stand up or lie down.
92
 After ten or fifteen minutes had passed and no 
nurse had arrived, Lewis pushed the emergency call button again and 
requested medical assistance.
93
 At approximately 6:05 a.m., 
Cichanowicz returned to Lewis’s cell with Nurse Angela McLean.
94
 
Lewis reported to McLean that he was experiencing “terrible pain in 
his back” and “couldn’t move.”
95
 Wisconsin State Secure Program 
Facility’s policy discourages staff from examining an inmate in his 
cell.
96
 Therefore, following the policy, McLean relayed to Lewis that 
guards would escort him to the infirmary after the headcount, which 
typically occurred at 6:15 a.m.
97
 McLean and Cichanowicz stated that 
Lewis would first have to stand with his back to his cell door so he 
could be handcuffed from behind through the slot in the door.
98
 Lewis 
contended that he was in terrible pain and he could not stand or move;  
he was only able to lean forward to press the call button.
99
 At this 
point Cichanowicz warned Lewis that if correctional officers had to be 
sent into the cell without first handcuffing Lewis, they would throw 
him on the ground and handcuff him from behind.
100
 Lewis reiterated 
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he could not move.
101
 McLean maintained that if Lewis wanted help 




After Cichanowicz and McLean left Lewis’s cell, Cichanowicz 
viewed the video footage of Lewis in his cell.
103
 Around 6:40 a.m., 
Cichanowicz told McLean that Lewis had not moved from a seated 
position on his bed since about 5:15 a.m.
104
 McLean did not take any 
actions.
105
 Less than an hour later, Sergeant Wayne Primmer heard 
from other staff that Lewis was complaining of pain and that he was 
unable to stand.
106
 Primmer viewed the live video footage from 
Lewis’s cell and saw him fall to the floor.
107
 Primmer then contacted 
Lieutenant Joni Shannon-Sharpe and briefed her about Cichanowicz’s 
earlier encounter with Lewis, Lewis’s continuing complaints of pain 




At approximately 7:30 a.m., Shannon-Sharpe went to Lewis’s 
cell.
109
 Like Cichanowicz, Shannon-Sharpe informed Lewis that 
guards could not enter the cell to take him to the infirmary unless he 
was restrained.
110
 Lewis repeated that he could not reach the door 
because of the pain in his back and that being on the floor increased 
his pain.
111
 Shannon-Sharpe then spoke with McLean and directed her 
to contact the on-call physician, Dr. Meena Joseph.
112
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Soon thereafter, at 7:40 a.m., McLean telephoned Dr. Joseph.
113
 
Dr. Joseph directed that Lewis be taken to a hospital.
114
 Subsequently, 
Shannon-Sharpe gathered five guards, two of which had medical 
training, to transport Lewis.
115
 The group entered Lewis’s cell at 7:58 
a.m.
116
 After abandoning their effort to force Lewis to a standing 
position to search him, the group restrained him, placed him in a 
wheelchair, searched him with a handheld metal-detector, lifted him 
into a van, and drove him to a local hospital.
117
 Lewis was admitted to 
the emergency room at 8:53 a.m.
118
 In the emergency room, doctors 
gave Lewis morphine for his back pain and Ativan for his agitation.
119
 
Lewis was diagnosed with myalgia
120
 and muscle spasms of the neck 
and upper back.
121
 An hour later, Lewis was able to stand and walk.
122
 
Lewis was prescribed ibuprofen and a muscle relaxant, and was 




B. District Court Opinion 
  
In April 2014, Lewis filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Lieutenant Cichanowicz, Lieutenant Shannon-Sharpe, Nurse 
McLean, Dr. Joseph, and the five guards who removed him from his 
cell with the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin.
124
 Lewis alleged that all of the named defendants showed 
















 The American Heritage Medical Dictionary defines myalgia as “[m]uscular 
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deliberate indifference to his severe back pain by delaying his access 
to medical care.
125
 Lewis also argued that Shannon-Sharpe and the 
five guards were indifferent to his back pain because they restrained 
him and did not take him to the hospital on a stretcher.
126
 Further, 
Lewis claimed that Shannon-Sharpe and the five guards used 
excessive force when handcuffing and transporting him to the 
hospital.
127
 Lastly, Lewis asserted malpractice claims against Nurse 
McLean and Dr. Joseph.
128
 
 Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
129
 
Writing for the district court, Chief U.S. District Judge 
James Peterson granted summary judgment for the defendants.
130
 The 
district court reasoned that undisputed evidence established only a 
“modest amount of force” was used, and none of it was applied 
“maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of infliction of pain.”
131
 
The district court further reasoned that even if Lewis’s back pain was a 
serious medical condition, a jury could not reasonably find from the 
evidence that “the defendants took longer than was necessary to assess 
[Lewis’s] medical issue and get him treatment” or that they “treated 
him unnecessarily roughly in restraining him.”
132
 Finally, the court 
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C. Appeal to Seventh Circuit 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
134
 “viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to Lewis.”
135
 
The majority considered whether a reasonable jury could find that 
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Lewis’s serious medical 
need.
136
 They vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on the deliberate indifference claim against Cichanowicz and 
McLean,
137
 concluding that “a jury reasonably could find that 
Cichanowicz and McLean exhibited deliberate indifference by 
delaying Lewis’s treatment for approximately one and a half hours—
the time that passed between their learning of Lewis’s condition and 





1.  Judge Rovner’s Majority Opinion 
 
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Lewis, the 
majority found that the disputed facts pertaining to Cichanowicz and 
McLean’s state of mind precluded a grant of summary judgment in 




Citing Farmer v. Brennan, Judge Ilana Rovner posited that in 
determining an Eighth Amendment violation alleged by a prisoner, the 
court performs a two-step analysis.
140
 First, the Court examines 
                                                 
134
 While the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly state it 
reviewed the case de novo, the court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. 
See e.g.,Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016). 
135
 Lewis, 864 F.3d at 565. 
136
 Id. at 558. 
137
 Id. at 566. 
138
 Id. at 563–64. 
139
 Id. at 565. 
140
 Id. 562-563. 
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whether the prisoner established an “objectively serious” medical 
condition.
141
 Second, the court determines whether the prison officials 
acted with a “sufficient state of mind,” specifically, that the officials 




In analyzing the first step, the court concluded that there was 
enough evidence to support a finding that Lewis’s muscle spasm and 
accompanying back pain was a serious medical condition.
143
 The court 
explained that a medical condition is significantly serious, as to fulfill 
the first step of the analysis, if an inmate has been diagnosed by a 
medical professional as needing treatment or is obvious in nature that 
a lay person would perceive the need for a physician’s attention.
144
 
Further, the court suggested that a medical condition need not be life 
threatening to be deemed serious.
145
 Rather, it could be a condition 
that, if not treated, would result in significant injury or unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain.
146
 
Turning to the second step, the majority first acknowledged that a 
jury could not reasonably find that Lieutenant Shannon-Sharpe, Dr. 
Joseph, and the guards who transported Lewis were deliberately 
indifferent in either assessing Lewis’s medical condition or in 
restraining and transporting him.
147
 The court commented that Lewis 
wisely limited his deliberate indifference claim to McLean and 
Cichanowicz, discussing the remaining defendants limitedly.
148
  
Accordingly, the Court then focused on the deliberate indifference 
claim specifically against Cichanowicz and McLean.
149
 Quoting Perez 
v. Fengolio, the majority maintained that “[a] delay in treatment may 
                                                 
141
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show deliberate indifference if it exacerbated the inmate's injury or 
unnecessarily prolonged his pain,” and “even brief, unexplained delays 
in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference.”
150
 Judge Rovner 
took issue that Cichanowicz and McLean had not provided an 
explanation for their inaction, and, instead, blamed Lewis for the 
delay.
151
 Judge Rovner noted that Cichanowicz and McLean argued 
that they were entitled not to act because Lewis failed to comply with 
their orders.
152
 Thus, they were asking the court to construe the 
evidence against Lewis, rather than in his favor.
 153
 Judge Rovner 
posited that, in effect, Cichanowicz and McLean requested to flip the 
standard for a review of summary judgment.
154
  
Judge Rovner stated that, construed in the light most favorable to 
Lewis, the evidence at summary judgement showed that Lewis 
experienced back pain from 5:15 a.m. until he received an injection of 
morphineapproximately four hours later.Further, that Lewis’s back 
pain was severe, and that Lewis begged Cichanowicz and McLean for 
help after they told him he would not receive treatment until he was 
restrained.
155
 The court also noted that Cichanowicz did nothing to 
help Lewis.
156
 Likewise, McLean did not help Lewis until Shannon-
Sharpe’s involvement promoted McLean to call Dr. Joseph.
157
 Judge 
Rovner contended that it was unclear if McLean and Cichanowicz 
would have assisted Lewis at all had Sergeant Primmer not reported 























 Id. at 565. 
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2. Judge Manion’s Concurrence 
  
Judge Daniel Manion began his concurrence by asserting that the 
Court’s opinion correctly applied controlling precedent, and he joined 
the opinion in full.
159
 Judge Manion argued that a reasonable juror 
could conclude from the record that Cichanowicz and McLean delayed 
Lewis’s treatment by more than an hour when they knew that Lewis 
was in severe pain.
160
 Specifically, Judge Manion purported that said 
juror could infer deliberate indifference because both Cichanowicz and 
McLean were aware from the video footage that Lewis had not moved 
since 5:15 a.m., nonetheless, did not take action to move the process 
along.
161
 Judge Manion reiterated that under controlling precedent, 
that would constitute deliberate indifference.
162
  
Judge Manion contended that he wrote separately to make two 
points.
163
 In his first point, Judge Manion stated that he did not read 
the Court’s opinion as being contingent on the length of the delay that 
Cichanowicz and McLean created.
164
 Judge Manion posited that the 
facts of this case, particularly that Cichanowicz and McLean confirm 
that Lewis was suffering in severe pain via the video footage, permit 
Lewis to survive summary judgment.
165
 Judge Manion acknowledged 
that under another set of facts an hour delay of treatment for a similar 
condition may not be enough to establish deliberate indifference.
166
 
In Judge Manion’s second point, he suggested that although he 
believed the court correctly applied controlling precedent, this case is 
a “striking example” of how far courts have departed from the text of 
the Eighth Amendment.
167
 Judge Manion urged that courts should not 
                                                 
159
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forget the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual 
punishment,” and that the deliberate indifference standard is 
tangentially related to the text, at best.
168
 Judge Manion emphasized 
that it seemed unlikely, from his perspective, that a prisoner who is 
taken to the hospital and entirely cured within five hours has endured 
anything cruel and unusual in the context of the prison system.
169
 In 
conclusion, Judge Manion suggested that courts should eventually 






 The Seventh Circuit majority incorrectly decided Lewis v. 
McLean, et al. because it failed to consider controlling Seventh Circuit 
precedent. Its own precedent holds that an inmate, who complains that 
a delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation, must 
place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the 
detrimental effect of the delay.
171
 As follows, in delay-in-treatment 
cases, courts should apply the verifying medical evidence standard. If 
there is no evidence of a detrimental effect,
 172
 a defendant should be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Consider the Absence of Verifying 
Medical Evidence 
 
Lewis’s objectively serious medical condition was a muscle 
spasm and accompanying back pain.
173
 There was an hour and a half 








 Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996). 
172
 “Detrimental effect” has not been squarely defined by the courts. Despite 
the lack of a conclusive definition, courts seem to operate under the assumption that 
equates detrimental effect to some degree of harm. Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 
715 (7th Cir. 2007). The degree of harm must be attributed only to the delay and not 
the underlying medical condition. Id. 
173
 Lewis, 864 F.3d at 563. 
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delay between the time Cichanowicz and McLean learned of Lewis’s 
condition and Dr. Joseph’s directive prompting action.
174
 In light of 
these facts, the Seventh Circuit concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Cichanowicz and 
McLean were deliberately indifferent to Lewis’s medical needs.
175
 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis was incomplete as it failed to 
consider precedent set forth in Langston v. Peters. Langston v. Peters 
requires a plaintiff to place verifying medical evidence into the record 
that an alleged delay in medical treatment had a detrimental effect.
176
 
In cases where there is a delay in medical treatment, courts 
require the plaintiff to establish “verifying medical evidence” that the 
delay, rather than the underlying condition, caused harm.
177
 In 
Langston v. Peters, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s 
standard that “[a]n inmate who complains that delay in medical 
treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying 
medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of 
delay in medical treatment to succeed.”
178
 The Seventh Circuit 
previously maintained the injury subsequent to a delay as the deciding 
factor in a case.
179
 
This case hinges on Cichanowicz and McLean’s delay and, 
therefore, should implicate a Langston analysis. Yet, no such analysis 
took place on the part of the Seventh Circuit. The district court, 
                                                 
174
 Id. at 563–64. 
175
 Id. at 565.  
176
 See Langston, 100 F.3d at 1240. 
177
 See e.g., id.; Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 
2007); Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005); Surber v. Dixie 
County Jail, 206 Fed. Appx. 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006). 
178
 Langston, 100 F.3d at 1240; see also Williams v Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714-
15 (7th Cir. 2007). 
179
 Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The decisive factor, 
however, is that Walker has no evidence that he was injured by the defendants’ 
refusal on some occasions to provide him Factor VIII.”). 
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however, considered the verifying medical evidence standard.
180
 In 
doing so, the court concluded, “[Lewis]’s allegations of deliberate 
indifference [were] not enough at th[at] point; [and] he [] also [had to] 




While a handful of cases hold that brief delays in treatment may 
constitute deliberate indifference,
182
 these cases are readily 
distinguishable from Lewis v. McLean, et al. The most similar of these 
cases, in terms of the length of delay, is Williams v. Liefer. In Williams 
v. Liefer, Williams awoke with chest pains and soon thereafter 
complained to a prisoner officer.
183
 Despite his complaint, Williams 
was required to complete a physically demanding transfer out of 
segregation.
184
 Approximately five hours after his initial complaint to 
the officer, Williams blacked out and fell backwards while walking up 
the stairs.
185
 At the hospital, six hours after William’s complaints, he 
was diagnosed with hypertension
186
 and chest pain.
187
 Williams’s 
blood pressure decreased after an hour but he remained in the 
infirmary for six days.
188
  
The material distinctions between this case and Williams are 
evident. First, the delay in Williams’s treatment was six hours,
189
 
whereas the delay in Lewis’s treatment was an hour and a half.
190
 
                                                 
180
 Lewis v. McLean, 14-CV-280-JDP, 2016 WL 80674, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 
7, 2016), judgment entered, 14-CV-280-JDP, 2016 WL 97647 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 
2016), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 864 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2017). 
181
 Id. (citing Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
182
 See e.g., Williams, 491 F.3d at 714-15; Edwards v. Synder, 478 F.3d 827 
(7th Cir. 2007); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996). 
183
 Williams, 491 F.3d at 712. 
184
 Id. at 712-13. 
185




 The American Heritage Medical Dictionary defines hypertension as 




 Id. at 716. 
190
 Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 563-64 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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Second, Lewis could stand and walk an hour after he was given pain 
medication,
191
 whereas William’s condition necessitated a six-day stay 
in the infirmary.
192
 This six-day stay in the infirmary essentially placed 
verifying medical evidence into the record that the delay caused 
Williams harm. No such evidence was presented by Lewis. Moreover, 
Lewis was discharged from the hospital ninety-one minutes after being 
admitted.
193
 Finally, in Williams, the delay itself was not related to 





1. Precedential and Public Policy Concerns  
 
 Holding that an hour and a half wait, with no detrimental 
effects, violates the Eighth Amendment is dangerous precedent and is 
contrary to public policy.
195
 From a precedent standpoint, very few 
delay-in-treatment cases will now be decided at the summary 
judgment stage. While Judge Manion indicated that he did not read the 
majority’s opinion as contingent on the length of the delay the 
defendants caused,
196
 the majority made no mention that the time 
frame was narrowly confined to the specific facts of the case. Read 
broadly, an hour and a half delay in any treatment can now amount to 
                                                 
191
 Id. at 560. 
192
 Williams, 491 F.3d at 713. 
193
 Lewis, 864 F.3d at 560. 
194
 Williams, 491 F.3d at 713. 
195
 The application of the verifying medical evidence standard, rather than a 
bright line rule that dictates how long of a wait is too long, is necessary for courts to 
come to consistent and logical outcomes. Consider if the facts of this case were the 
same but, rather than the inmate suffer from severe back pain, he suffered from a 
heart attack. The defendants, due to the same security concerns, waited over an hour 
and a half to take the inmate to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, the inmate 
dies due to heart failure. This is precisely verifying medical evidence that the delay, 
rather than the condition, caused harm. Without consideration of the impact the 
conduct had on the inmate, courts will be forced to erroneously decide how long is 
too long to delay treatment. 
196
 Lewis, 864 F.3d at 566 (Manion, J., concurring). 
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deliberate indifference of a serious medical need. This has 
implications in both the legal and medical fields.  
The purpose of summary judgment is to prevent wasting judicial 
resources on unnecessary trials.
197
 The Lewis Court’s decision runs 
contrary to this principal as it substantially narrows the number of 
cases that will be disposed at the summary judgment stage. In practice, 
a delay amounting to an hour and a half or longer will now preclude 
granting summary judgment. Even more concerning is the potential 
that any delay will amount to deliberate indifference. Given the 
trajectory Seventh Circuit delay cases have taken, this is a realistic 
prospect.  
From the medical perspective, the effects of this decision are 
equally devastating. First, this decision may place unattainable 
requirements on prison officials and prison medical professionals.  
Unfortunately, delays are common in prisons with limited resources.
198
 
Delays, however, are not exclusive to prison health care but are 
present in nearly all health care circumstances. “In fact, the public 
often waits longer at hospital emergency rooms.”
199
  
Second, few medical professionals will be able to dispose of cases 
in the early stages of litigation. Significantly, prison medical 
professionals facing potential liability under the deliberate indifference 
standard risk being held personally financially accountable for the 
judgment; insurers often do not cover deliberate or intentional acts.
200
 
The prospect of facing personal financial liability may disincentivize 
                                                 
197
 John F. Lapham, Summary Judgment Before the Completion of Discovery: 
A Proposed Revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), 24 U MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 253, 259 (1990). 
198
 Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 25, 
2016), cert. denied (2017). 
199
 Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996). 
200
 See e.g., Eliot M. Harris, The Duty To Defend: What Insurers, Insureds And 
Their Counsel Need To Know When Faced With A Liability Coverage Dispute - ABA 
YLD 101 Practice Series, A.B.A. Young Lawyers Division, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_pract 
ice_series/duty.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2017); AHC Media, Not all claims covered 
by med/mal policies, https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/64652-not-all- claims-
covered-by-med-mal-policies (last visited Dec. 2, 2017). 
24
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competent physicians from working in the prison health care system to 
protect themselves from liability.
201
 This may prove even more 
accurate as it will be difficult to decide claims early in litigation. The 
likely result: fewer competent physicians and a lower quality prison 
health care system.  
 
2. Penological Concerns  
 
The Supreme Court has regularly upheld prison regulations that 
may otherwise violate an inmate’s constitutional right where the 
regulation is legitimately related to penological concerns
202
; in 
particular, when the regulation is necessary to protect institutional 
order and security.
203
 At the crux of this rationale is that internal 
security is a central goal of all corrections institutions.
204
 It is in light 
of these legitimate penological objectives that courts must assess 
challenges to prison regulations based on asserted constitutional rights 
of prisoners.
205
 While the Supreme Court has commented that security 
and medical needs do not ordinarily conflict,
206
 the needs in this case 
did. 
Of significance, the Seventh Circuit did not take into 
consideration, nor even mention that the Wisconsin State Secure 
Program Facility in which Lewis was housed is a maximum-security 
prison. This narrow view of Lewis’s medical care and surrounding 
circumstances runs contrary to previous holdings of the court. The 
Seventh Circuit has long held that when examining a claim of 
deliberate indifference for either alleged action or inaction, it is 
                                                 
201
 Sweeney, supra note 56, at 90. 
202
 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).  
203
 Id. at 93. 
204




 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 
U.S. 312, 320 (1986). 
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obligated to examine the totality of the circumstances.
207
 In this case, 
however, the Seventh Circuit all but turned a blind eye to the fact that 
the delay was because of prison protocol and for safety purposes.  
The Seventh Circuit decided cases that directly analyzed the 
interplay between deliberate indifference and penological interests.
208
 
These cases stand for the proposition that an inexplicable delay in 
treatment supports an inference of deliberate indifference where there 
is no penological interest.
209
 Here, there was a penological interest that 
caused the delay, and yet, the Seventh Circuit paid this no lip service. 
 Applying the verifying medical evidence standard, the defendants 
should be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Considering the 
complete absence of verifying medical evidence, the totality of the 
prison context, and the ease in which Lewis was treated, it is hard to 
imagine a reasonable fact finder concluding that the hour and a half 
delay between the time Cichanowicz and McLean learned of Lewis’s 
condition and Dr. Joseph’s directive prompting action was so 
unreasonable that it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
B. Courts Should Return to Applying the Proscription of Cruel and 
Unusual Enumerated in the Constitution 
 
 The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in this area has 
extended far beyond what “cruel and unusual” suggests to a lay 
person.
210
 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel 
                                                 
207
 Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2003); Dunigan ex rel. 
Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Gutierrez 
v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 (7th Cir.1996). 
208
 See e.g., Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended 
(Aug. 25, 2016), cert. denied (2017); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 2007).  
209
 See e.g., Petties, 836 F.3d at 730. 
210
 Andrew DeSimone, et. al, Jailhouse Doc: Defending Eighth Amendment 
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 Therefore, it is instructive that the action 
or inaction is what is relevant in an Eighth Amendment inquiry. Yet, 
the deliberate indifference inquiry analyzes the intent of the individual 
alleged to have violated the constitution. The disconnect between the 
focus of both inquiries results in an unworkable standard. 
 
1. The Deliberate Indifference Standard is Only Tangentially Related 
to the Text of the Constitution 
 
Since the inception of the deliberate indifference standard, courts 
seem to have forgotten that the Amendment proscribes the infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishment.
212
 It is a stretch of monumental 
proportion to hold that Lewis endured anything cruel and unusual in 
the prison context, either by present day definition or as the framers 
intended. As Judge Manion highlighted in his concurrence: “this case 





2. Deliberate Indifference is Difficult to Apply and Does Not Get to 
the Heart of “Cruel and Unusual” 
 
The deliberate indifference standard for cruel and unusual 
punishment in prisoner health care traditionally requires a showing of 
intent to harm.
 214
 This requirement makes the standard amorphous and 
unworkable.
215
 Given that the text of the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause concerns the action or inaction taken in deciding whether there 
is a violation,
216
 it is inappropriate to hinge a finding of cruel and 
                                                 
211
 U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
212
 See id. 
213
 Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 566 (7th Cir. 2017) (Manion, J., 
concurring).  
214
 Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the 
Provision of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 946 (1992). 
215
 Id. at 935. 
216
 See generally U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
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unusual punishment on the subjective state of the prison official or 
medical professional.
217
 The all-encompassing nature of prisons 
complicates attempts to determine intent because it is difficult to 
pinpoint whose intent is relevant.
218
 Additionally, many courts seem to 
infer intent on the part of the prison official
219
 or the prison medical 
professional.  
The difficulties of the standard are evidenced by the range of 
court interpretations. The Seventh Circuit’s recent decisions alone 
paint a picture of inconsistency.
220
 Therefore, what should be relevant 
are the treatment itself and the harm, if any, the inmate suffered.  
 
C. State Law Medical Malpractice Claims are Best Fit for Actions 
Against Medical Professionals 
 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that the proper forum for 
claims of substandard medical care is state medical malpractice 
lawsuits.
221
 Particular to this case, Lewis did not contend that he did 
                                                 
217
 The dissent in Gamble stated, “whether the constitutional standard has been 
violated should turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation of 
the individual who inflicted it.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1967) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). See also Friedman, supra note 214, at 947. 
218
 Friedman, supra note 214, at 947. 
219
 See Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and 
Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1815, 1817 (2012). 
220
 On January 30, 2017, less than six months before deciding Lewis v. 
McLean, the Seventh Circuit decided Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry. In 
Miller, inmate William Miller told various prison guards he suffered from a brain 
tumor and required placement on a bottom bunk; despite his medical need, he was 
placed on the top bunk. Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F.3d 425, 426 
(7th Cir. 2017). Miller fell off the top bunk twice; the second time breaking his back 
and suffering other serious injuries. Id. at 426-27. The Court affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, reasoning that 
Miller did not sue the right defendants. Id. at 427. The Court additionally reasoned 
that Miller’s communication to the guard that he had a brain tumor “[fell] short of 
demonstrating a serious medical need.” Id. at 428.  
221
 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976). 
28
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 13                                        Fall 2017 
 
152 
not received carehe was taken to the hospital and prescribed 
ibuprofen and a muscle relaxant.
222
 Instead, Lewis argued that he 
received inadequate care because of the delay in his treatment. This is 
a quintessential claim of medical malpractice. 
Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the 
dispute is about the adequacy of the treatment, “federal courts are 
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to 
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”
223
 The 
rationale behind this is that balance of protecting interests cannot be 
left to the unguided discretion of a judge or jury.
224
  
State medical malpractice laws are often best equipped to 
evaluate claims against medical professionals
225
 by requiring the 
support of an expert who is educated, trained and experienced in the 
area of health care or medicine at issue in the action.
226
 The policy 
underlying this requirement is that experts familiar with the field are 
able to testify, and guide the court to determine if the defendant 
deviated from the applicable standard of care.
227
 There is no expert 
witness affidavit requirement for federal claims of deliberate 
indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
228
 In effect, this leads to 
                                                 
222
 Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2017). 
223
 See e.g., Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976); Layne v. 
Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette 
County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1979); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 
1507 (11th Cir. 1991). 
224
 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). 
225
 Nearly all medical professionals can be held liable for deliberate 
indifference, not just physicians. See e.g., Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (holding nurse could reasonably be deemed to show deliberate 
indifference to inmate’s pain); Key v. Kolitwenzew, 630 Fed. Appx. 620, 623 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (holding inmate set forth a plausible account of facts that the physician’s 
assistant demonstrated deliberate indifference). 
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 735 ILCS 5/2-622. 
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 See e.g., Brief for Correctional Medical Services, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, p. 
15, Correctional Medical Services, Inc. v. Alma Glisson, Personal Representative of 
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unwarranted and frivolous lawsuits against prison health care 
providers that are unsupported by law or medicine.
229
  
The economics of inmate-initiated litigation is abundantly 
present in the conversation. On the one hand, retaining an expert may 
be prohibitively expensive for an inmate.
230
 If an inmate cannot retain 
an expert, he cannot file
231
 a medical malpractice action.
232
 Courts are 
not authorized to offer financial assistance to inmates to hire expert 
witnesses, as they are not similarly authorized to do so for non-
prisoners.
233
 On the other hand, inmate litigation is inherently 
unique.
234
 This uniqueness includes: free time, seeing litigation as 
“recreation,” incentives to humiliate their jailors, access to legal 
materials,
235
 “proclivity to violate the law,” and a lack of financial or 






 A minor delay in treatment is a disappointing disparity from 
deliberate indifference leading to cruel and unusual punishment. Given 
the present-day framework of the deliberate indifference standard, 
courts considering alleged violations of constitutional rights should 
                                                                                                                   





 See Chapman, supra note 74. 
231
 Few medical malpractices cases do not require expert testimony. Res Ipsa 
Loquitur claims, Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” do not require expert 
testimony where negligence is obvious and within the common knowledge of a 
juror. Examples of this include operating on the wrong limb or leaving surgical 
instruments or sponges within the body. B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical 
Malpractice in the United States, CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 467(2): 384 (2009). 
232
 See 735 ILCS 5/2-622. 
233
 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915; Gaviria v. Reynolds, 476 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied (2007). 
234
 See Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 599 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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 Including “inmate writ-writers” who engaged in unauthorized practice of 
law. 
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 See id. at 592-93. 
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concentrate on the inmate’s treatment and the harm, if any, the inmate 
suffered, rather than the intent of the accused individual. Accusations 
of harm should require reinforcement by medical records or medical 
expert testimony. Until courts return to applying the text of the 
constitution, these modifications are necessary to ensure that claims 
under the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth 
Amendment are truly cruel and unusual. 
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